A major debate in microfinance focuses on the existence of a trade-off between the financial sustainability of microfinance institutions (MFIs) and their outreach to poor clients. This paper adds to this debate by analyzing whether financial and social efficiency are mutually exclusive in a context of implicit subsidies by the state and international donors. We use data from a sample of 28 Vietnamese MFIs and apply Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to identify the existence of a trade-off. Our analysis shows that for Vietnamese MFIs financial and social efficiency are not related. We interpret this as evidence for the fact that there is no support to believe that there is such a trade-off. Subsidies, based on which most Vietnamese MFIs currently operate, helps them to show high financial efficiency, while at the same time being able to attain their social goals. Nevertheless, this model may not be sustainable in the long-term. 
Introduction
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) focus on providing financial services to poor households who are excluded from the formal financial system.
Having access to finance is crucial for the poor as this helps them to smooth their consumption, generate business opportunities and improve their inclusion in the formal economy in the long run (Collins et al., 2009 ). In some cases, microcredits can even empower rural women (Chan and Ghani, 2011 ). An important debate in the microfinance discussion focuses on whether it is possible for MFIs to be financially sustainable, i.e. not being dependent on subsidies, while at the same being able to reach out and serve a large number of poor clients (i.e. socially sustainable). Because providing financial services to the poor may be a very costly activity, focusing on outreach may, at least potentially, conflict with the financial sustainability of MFIs, i.e. there may be a trade-off between financial and social sustainability (Hermes and Lensink, 2007) . Such a trade-off could question whether the microfinance sector is able to achieve its double bottom line mission of improving the lives of the poor while being independent of donor support in the long run.
Previous studies have investigated the trade-off between the social and financial sustainability of MFIs (see, e.g., Cull et al., 2007; Hermes et al., 2011) .This paper adds to the debate on the trade off by analyzing whether financial and social sustainability are mutually exclusive, using data from a sample of 28 Vietnamese MFIs. We look into this question by focusing on the financial and social performance of these MFIs and analyze whether they are interlinked. We measure performance by focusing on the financial and social efficiency of institutions, using Data Envelop Analysis (DEA). In particular, we look at efficiency as the outcome of a process where input costs are minimized to obtain a given level of outputs, where outputs are both financial or social.
Analyzing the existence of a trade-off between financial and social sustainability using data from the Vietnamese microfinance sector is interesting, because microfinance in this country differs quite significantly in terms of its history and structure from microfinance in other emerging economies. Indeed, microfinance in the Vietnamese context can be termed as the subsidized provision of microcredit due to active involvement of mass organizations and state development banks. While recent crosscountry research suggests that unsubsidized MFIs may differ in terms of social performance (D'espallier et al., 2013) , this paper provides new evidence on the potential efficiency trade-off in a context of large-scale subsidization such as Vietnam.
The question we address is whether, and if so, how this model of implicit subsidies based on which most Vietnamese MFIs currently operate affect their financial and social efficiency and whether this model can be sustainable in the long-term. This question is highly policy relevant in the Vietnamese context, since the country's government has recently shown to be willing to change its policies of subsidizing the microfinance sector and has therefore recently started to encourage market-based microfinance through independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and licensed MFIs. This change in policies is related to the recently emerging willingness of the authorities to commit to economic liberalization and international integration (Rowley and Wagner, 2010) The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the main features of the Vietnamese microfinance sector and how it compares to its Asian and international peers. Section 3 reviews the literature that focuses on assessing MFI efficiency and in particular on the existence of a trade-off between financial and social efficiency. The DEA methodology and model selection is presented in section 4, followed by the description of the data and variables in section 5. Section 6 presents the results of the efficiency scores of the Vietnamese MFIs in our database and discusses the determinants of financial and social efficiency. Section 7 concludes.
The country context
Vietnam's poverty rate significantly decreased from 37 per cent in 1998 to about 14 per cent in 2011 (World Bank, 2011 ). Yet, since 2007 the country has been hit by the global economic downturn. Currently, it experiences growing economic turmoil, which, among other things has led to increasing inequalities between urban and rural areas and among regions. These increasing inequalities provide fertile ground for the development of microfinance. Indeed, improving financial inclusion by providing a large scope of financial services, allowing the poor to develop income-generating activities, protect themselves from negative shocks, and build assets, is a relevant policy objective to favor the inclusion of the poor in the country's general move towards increased living standards.
At the same time, the structure of the Vietnamese microfinance sector, both in terms or regulation, policy interventions, targeted clients and lending practices, differs significantly from "mainstream" microfinance The remainder of microfinance services is provided by a small but growing non state-led sector, consisting of local and international NGOs, social funds and schemes directly implemented by mass organizations.
Many of these organizations face difficulties to serve larger number of customers. The two largest microfinance actors in this category are CEP and TYM, which (indirectly) are linked to state-related actors such as the Ho-Chi-Minh Labor Federation (in case of CEP) and the VWU's (TYM).
Finally, next to these formal institutions and NGOs, microfinance in Vietnam is provided informally, by Ho's/Hui's (ROSCAs), friends and relatives without interests and with flexible terms, and through moneylenders with high average interest rates. The informal sector's share within the Vietnamese microfinance is estimated at 11 per cent in a report commissioned in 2011 by the Vietnam Microfinance Working Group (VMWG). Recourse to informal financial service provision is still popular, especially in rural areas, as their flexible terms make it easier for rural dwellers to cope with uncertainties during the harvest period. Informal consumption loans are also popular as the formal sector mainly provides investment loans, sometimes based on politically biased criteria.
The Vietnamese government has recently taken actions to reform the formal sector subsidized-lending system, which costs more than USD 200 million to the government's budget each year (Nguyen and Vogel, 2012) . In To summarize the above discussion, the Vietnamese microfinance sector differs quite significantly in its history and structure from microfinance as organized in other Asian countries, with a high proportion of subsidized credit along with an active involvement of mass organizations and state development banks. In the remainder of this paper we focus on analyzing how this model of implicit subsidies affects operations and the sector's performance in terms of attaining high levels of financial and social performance.
Financial versus social sustainability: A brief review
Two approaches are dominant in discussions on the trade-off between financial and social sustainability (Robinson, 2001) . According to the socalled "financial systems" approach, there is no trade-off between sustainability and the number of poor clients served. Actually, this approach argues that a larger pool of poor clients can be serviced once an MFI becomes financially sustainable, i.e. financial and social sustainability are complements rather than substitutes. Emphasizing financial sustainability and commercializing microfinance allow for increasing outreach by attracting additional funds from private investor and ensuring the long-term provision of financial services to the poor. Similarly, increased competition, better regulation and new technologies can improve the long-term efficiency of MFIs, which may help generating additional resources to increase access to financial services for the poor. Therefore, according to this approach, increased financial and social sustainability can go hand in hand. The importance of long-term financial sustainability for MFIs started to be emphasized in the 1990s when the financial systems approach received more and more attention.
In contrast, supporters of the so-called "poverty lending" approach focus on the predominance of the welfare of clients rather than the sustainability of institutions. They argue that the poor cannot afford to pay the higher interest rates MFIs need to charge in order to become financially sustainable. It is costlier for an MFI to serve remote rural and poorer communities as compared to urban and marginally poor clients. Financial and social sustainability may therefore be in conflict at some point of the MFI's expansion and struggle against competitors. Consequently, MFIs may be pushed to increase the size of loans they provide as a way to increase financial margins, which means they move up-market and start serving less poor customers, a process known as "mission drift". Thus, according to the poverty lending approach financial and social sustainability are substitutes, i.e. there is a trade-off between these two goals of MFIs. The poverty lending approach was dominant during the early days of microfinance, i.e. in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s.
Since the 1990s, with the rising attention of financial sustainability, the debate on the trade-off between financial and social sustainability has gained prominence among microfinance practitioners as well as among academic researchers. Researchers aim at measuring the financial and social performance of MFIs and subsequently investigate whether the performance of one type of performance goes at the cost of the other.
Overall, the results of empirical studies seem to be mixed.
A number of studies find supporting evidence for the view that for-profit networks on the other hand. He shows that a stronger for-profit orientation correlates with higher interest rates for MFI clients, indicating that there may be a trade-off between financial and social performance. At the same time, however, he finds that financial sustainability is not improved when MFIs raise interest rates, because profit orientation is also associated with higher MFI costs. Bos and Millone (2013) use data of 1,146
MFIs and find that financial and social sustainability are not necessarily substitutes. A considerable number of MFIs in their sample are able to offer small loans at affordable costs. At the same time, however, they show that once MFIs increase loan size to reap economies of scale, outreach decreases.
Moreover, they find that focusing lending on women has a negative impact on efficiency.
Other studies do not find clear evidence for the existence of a tradeoff in microfinance. Gutierrez-Nieto et al. (2009; 2011) find a low but significant positive correlation between social and financial efficiency. They conclude that profitability and social efficiency follow their own track, while they is no apparent trade-off between financial and social efficiency. balanced results. They find that for-profit MFIs are no less efficient at reaching the poor than non-profit ones, but they also observe that Cambodian MFIs are becoming less outreach efficient over time while increasing their profitability. Omri and Chkoundali (2011) 
Method
Several empirical studies discussed in the previous section measure performance of MFIs in terms of efficiency, i.e. how does an individual MFI perform (financially and/or socially) as compared to the maximum performance it can reach given the available resources. Efficiency can be measured by using either parametric or non-parametric techniques. One of the most widely used non-parametric techniques is the so-called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach (Charnes et al., 1978; Banker et al., 1984) . DEA combines input and output data to calculate a best practice efficient production frontier. This efficient frontier plots a piece-wise representation of either the minimum input per output or the maximum output per input (Crawford et al. 2011 ). In the context of the analysis in this paper, DEA allows to distinguish between efficient and relatively inefficient MFIs. The former operate on the frontier while the latter are performing below the frontier. The distance from the production frontier is a measure of the inefficiency of an individual MFI.
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One advantage of DEA as compared to parametric approaches is that it does not require an ex ante specification of the functional form to be applied to the data in order to estimate efficiency scores. It is less data demanding and can handle small sample sizes. Finally, it allows to perform peer analysis while also accommodating the inclusion of any kind of input and output in different measurement units without the need to standardize the data. As such, it seems more suitable to measure MFIs' efficiency and performance as it can include both financial and non-financial information in the same model to calculate efficiency scores (Ben Soltane 2008).
However, DEA does not handle measurement errors. Moreover, it imposes conditions on homogeneity, i.e. it assumes that institutions carry out similar activities and produce comparable products and services so that a common set of outputs can be defined; it also assumes that similar resources are available to all institutions and that they operate in a similar environment. This means that comparisons of the efficiency of MFIs are best carried out within a single country context (Balkenhol and Hudon 2011) .
DEA allows for different assumptions regarding the nature of return to scales, as it can be performed using a constant return to scale (CRS) or a variable return to scale (VRS) model. The CRS model relies on the assumption that there is no relationship between the scale of operations and the efficiency level, which leads to calculating Overall Technical Efficiency (OTE) scores for each MFI. Yet, these OTE scores can be biased 5 We do not provide a detailed discussion of the DEA approach in this paper. For detailed accounts of this approach, see, e.g., Charnes et al. (1978) and Banker et al. (1984) . 6 Stochastic frontier analysis, which is an alternative non-parametric approach, does take into account measurement errors. Yet, data requirements for this approach are much higher, making it not suitable for the analysis in this paper.
downward by scale inefficiencies if not all MFIs are operating at optimal scale. By assuming variable return to scale, the VRS model allows to calculate pure technical efficiency scores (PTE), i.e. the measurement of technical efficiency that is not influenced by scale efficiency (SE) effects.
Although in theory, it may be important to decompose OTE scores into PTE and SE scores, our data analysis reveals that the correlation between OTE, PTE and SE for both financial and social efficiency measures is high (i.e. ranging between 0.71 and 0.83). We therefore focus our attention on the analysis of OTE scores in the remainder of this paper, which is in line with the approach taken by several other studies in the literature (see, e.g., Gutierrez-Nieto et al., 2009; 2011). 7 Next, we discuss whether we should take an input or output orientation. Calculations of efficiency may either focus on maximizing outputs, i.e. keeping inputs constant while maximizing output levels; or focus on minimizing inputs, i.e. keeping output levels constant while reducing the use of inputs as much as possible. Kumbhakar and Lozano Vivas (2005) argue that most DEA studies in banking use input-oriented models, as the banking industry is focused on cost-minimization, while output levels are mainly determined by demand factors. Similar arguments hold for MFIs. We therefore opt for using an input-oriented DEA model.
In selecting inputs and outputs of banks two approaches have been used in the literature, i.e. the production approach and the intermediation approach. The production approach considers financial institutions as production units that use standard inputs to process financial services.
Examples of inputs used in this approach are total assets, operating costs and number of employees; outputs are usually the number of borrowers and/or savers. The intermediation approach considers financial institutions as intermediaries between savers and borrowers. Inputs used in this approach include loanable funds, deposits, financial costs, number of employees, equity and/or total assets; outputs include gross loan portfolio and/or financial income. According to Gutierrez-Nieto et al. (2007; 7 In the remainder of the paper we use the term efficiency, referring to the overall technical efficiency (OTE) scores.
2011), the production approach is best suited for most MFIs, as their emphasis is on granting loans, rather than collecting deposits. In fact, many
MFIs do not even collect deposits, which is a crucial aspect of the intermediation approach, but receive donations and subsidies.
Both the production and intermediation approach focus on the financial efficiency of MFIs. However, these institutions have two goals, i.e.
financial and social efficiency. DEA can also be used to calculate social 
Data
Data for all input and output variables described in the previous section, as well as for all other institutional characteristics used in the analysis, have been collected for a sample of 28 non state-owned formal and semi-formal 
The lower the value of K, the smaller the average loan in relative terms.
Next, for each MFI we standardize the value of to the (0,1) range by removing the minimum value of K and dividing by the range of K. The depth of outreach is obtained as follows:
The closer is to 1, the higher the depth of outreach. We then multiply by the number of active borrowers for MFI to obtain an outreach indicator that takes into account both breadth and depth of outreach, i.e. a socially efficient MFI is an MFI that makes a large number of small loans targeted to the poorest borrowers.
Our second social output variable is number of depositors, measured as the number of clients with any type of deposit account, whether voluntary or compulsory. We include the number of depositors as a social output, in addition to the above described credit-based outreach indicator, as following Collins et al. (2009) we consider deposit and saving services to be equally important as credit facilities for poor clients. We also opt for number of deposits accounts over total amount deposited as in the Vietnamese context savings products are not very developed, and the fact that an MFI proposes such service to the greatest number of clients is sufficient as such to be considered socially beneficial to poor clients, irrespective of the amount deposited per depositor.
Descriptive statistics of the input and output variables are provided in Table 1. <Insert table 1 here>
Empirical analysis
We start by reporting our findings on the efficiency scores of the MFIs in our sample. The picture is different when we look at social efficiency scores. MFIs are, on average, no less financially efficient than other MFIs. As discussed in section 2, these high efficiency indicators can be explained the specific low-cost, low competition and subsidized structure of the microfinance sector in Vietnam. These characteristics allow MFIs to keep costs low, reducing the need to increase average loan sizes to cover costs.
This contrasts with the situation in, for example many Latin American countries, where the market mechanism in the microfinance sector are stronger and subsidies are more exceptional.
<Insert table 4 here>
Table 4 also shows that social efficiency and productivity of staff, measured as the ratio of the number of active borrower on the total number of staff employed by the MFI, are correlated positively, suggesting that serving a higher number of borrowers increases poverty outreach.
Moreover, social efficiency is positively correlated with return on assets, negatively correlated with operational expense ratio and cost per borrower, and positively associated with operational self-sufficiency. These outcomes suggest that better financial performance provides MFIs with better opportunities to increase outreach. Finally, social efficiency shows a weakly positive correlation with the age of the institution, suggesting that social performance of institutions increases as they become more experienced.
With respect to financial efficiency, table 4 suggests that this is positively correlated with return on assets and operational self-sufficiency, and negatively with the operational expense ratio. These results are generally in line with what has been observed elsewhere. Moreover, financial efficiency is positively correlated with the age of the institution, i.e. more experienced institutions are more financially efficient.
Next, we investigate whether financial and social efficiency are related by using multiple regression analysis. We apply Tobit regressions, because our efficiency measures are censored, i.e. their values are bounded between zero and one. This result supports the correlation analysis reported in table 4. Moreover, financial efficiency is negatively associated with the operating expense ratio, which suggests that financially efficient MFIs operate at lower cost.
Finally, cost per borrower is positively associated with financial efficiency.
This may be expected as costs per borrower increase with average loan sizes and higher loan size is associated with financially more efficient MFIs.
Return on assets and operational self-sufficiency are not associated with financial efficiency, which is not in line with the outcomes of the correlation analysis. These latter results suggest that financial performance and financial efficiency do not necessarily go hand in hand in the case of Vietnamese MFIs. <Insert table 5 here>   Table 5, 
Discussion: The Controversial Role of Subsidies
The high level of subsidizations of Vietnamese MFIs is controversial. For instance, Bateman (2011, p. 198) This may imply that grants are to be decreased in the future. This is all te more worrisome as uncertainty prevails about the future of the Vietnamese economy (Rowley and Troung, 2009) . Therefore, the Vietnamese model of subsidizing operations does not seem to be a long-term sustainable model unless all domestic and international public actors guarantee continuous subsidization.
Some authors have also argued that excessive subsidization may reduce incentives to optimize and improve operations, a phenomenon frequently called "soft budget constraint". Analyzing a sample of international MFIs, Hudon and Traca (2011) show that subsidization leads to better productivity but that marginal productivity decreases above a certain threshold of subsidization. Donors and state actors' responsibility is thus to find the appropriate and most efficient level of subsidization.
Our empirical findings contribute to the literature on the performance of state-led institutions in Asia. For instance, Burgess and Pande (2005) analyze the performance of the Indian nation-wide social banking program 12 and find that it significantly reduces poverty in rural areas; at the same time, however, the program is not sustainable.
D 'espallier et al. (2013) show that unsubsidized Asian MFIs tend to charge higher interest rates than the others. If Vietnamese MFIs do not quickly adapt to an environment in which the direct and indirect subsidies are significantly reduced or secure long term financing, it could be a matter of only a few years before the trade-off between financial and social efficiency, which has been found to be significant in a number of microfinance studies, becomes apparent in the Vietnamese microfinance sector as well.
Concluding remarks
In this study we examined whether there is a trade-off between financial and social efficiency of MFIs in Vietnam. This is a hotly debated issue, both in academic and policy circles, but existing empirical evidence is inconclusive. Also in Vietnam policy makers are currently considering policies that may have an impact on the financial and social efficiency of MFIs. Therefore, an empirical analysis focusing on the financial and social efficiency performance of MFIs operating in the country may make an important contribution to policy making. At the same time, it may also add to the empirical literature in general by showing the importance of taking into account the country-specific setting in order to understand how financial and social efficiency may be related.
The results from the DEA analysis indicated that first of all Vietnamese MFIs on average are highly financially and socially efficient. Note: P-values are given between brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.
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APPENDIX
Description of variables used in the DEA and multivariate analysis
Age: number of year of activity of the MFI.
Cost per Borrower: ratio of operating costs of an MFI on the average number of active borrowers of the MFI.
Financial revenue: measured as the revenue generated from the gross loan portfolio and from investments of the MFI, plus other operating revenue.
Gross loan portfolio: the MFI's outstanding loans including current, delinquent and restructured loans, and excluding loans that have been written off.
Number of depositors: the number of clients with any type of deposit account, whether voluntary or compulsory.
Operating costs: expenses related to operations of an MFI, including all personnel expense, depreciation and amortization, and administrative expense.
Operational expense ratio: ratio of operating costs of an MFI on the average gross loan portfolio of the MFI.
Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS): ratio of financial revenue of an MFI on the sum of financial expense, impairment loss and operating expense of the MFI.
Poverty outreach measure: ratio of the average loan balance per borrower of an MFI on the average annual income per capita in the province(s) where the MFI operates, standardized to the (0,1) range.
Return on Assets: ratio of net operating income on total assets.
Staff productivity: ratio of the number of active borrower on the total number of staff employed by the MFI.
Total Assets: all net asset accounts.
Total Liabilities: all net liabilities accounts, including net equity.
Total number of staff: number of individuals who are actively employed by the MFI.
